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The costs of involutary job loss are of substantial research and policy interest. We consider
the measurement of the cost of job displacement with household expenditure data. With
a Canadian panel survey of individuals who experienced a job separation, we compare the
consumption growth of households that experienced a permanent layoﬀ to a control group
of households that experienced a temporary layoﬀ with known recall date. Because the
ﬁrms employing the latter group are providing insurance, these workers approximate a
bench mark of full insurance against job loss shocks. We estimate that permanent layoﬀs
experience an average consumption loss of between 4 and 10 percent. Older workers and
workers with high job tenure have losses closer to the top of this range.
JEL Classiﬁcations: D91, J63, J65
Keywords: Job Displacement, ConsumptionExecutive Summary
For many workers the loss of a job because of a plant closure or permanent layoﬀ
may be detrimental to their living standards in the long run. This will happen if they
have considerable diﬃculty ﬁnding new employment, or if they had important skills that
were speciﬁc to the lost job and which they are not able to employ in a new job. Such
workers disproportionately bear the costs of the adjustments necessary for the continued
economic prosperity of their society. Estimating the size of their losses is a necessary
ﬁrst step in considering policies aimed at compensating these workers or mitigating their
losses.
We use total household consumption before and after job loss to measure the cost
of the job loss. Consumption is a natural measure of living standards. Moreover, con-
sumption losses are conceptually diﬀerent from earnings losses. Earnings losses may be
persistent, but both theory and data suggest that they are not fully persistent: there
is eventually some “catch up.” In contrast, economic theory suggests that consumption
losses are roughly permanent. The intuition behind this claim is that a forward look-
ing, rational household’s post-displacement consumption choice already reﬂects their best
guess of future earnings, including any anticipated “catch up.” Thus, by examining con-
sumption, we can infer the long-run cost of a job loss from data collected soon after the
event.
Household consumption can change for a number of reasons other than job loss: for
example, because of macroeconomic shocks or changes in the size and composition of
the family. To estimate the cost of a job loss to a household, we need to estimate what
1would have happened to that household’s consumption if they were fully insured against
job losses. This comparison provides an upper bound on the beneﬁto fany new cost
mitigating policy introduced in current economic environment (because no policy can
provide more than full insurance).
To make this comparison, we compare each household in our data that experienced
a job loss to households that experienced a temporary layoﬀ a n da r es i m i l a ri nt e r m so f
observable characteristics. Firms that use temporary layoﬀs to manage demand shocks
eﬀectively insure their workers against job loss. Thus households that experience tempo-
rary layoﬀs provide a natural way to approximate the average consumption growth that
job-losing households would have experienced if they were fully insured against job loss.
Our main ﬁnding is that permanently displaced workers suﬀer a consumption loss of 4
to 10% of pre-job-loss consumption, with a point estimate of 6.4%. The rough implication
of this estimate is that, on average, households that experience a job loss must lower their
spending by about 6%, permanently.
Our analysis also indicates that older workers, and workers with high pre-displacement
job tenure have considerably larger average losses - perhaps double the average for all
displaced workers. This information is potentially useful for targeting adjustment policies.
Our estimates reﬂect the current economic environment, including those adjustment
and assistance policies already in place. Thus while they are informative about the size of
the losses that could be mitigated by further policy initiatives, they are not informative
about the consequences of removing or scaling back current provisions.
21 Introduction
For many workers the loss of a job because of plant closure or a permanent layoﬀ may
involve a considerable loss of lifetime welfare. These workers bear a disproportionate share
of the costs of reallocation in a dynamic economy. Given the potential for large losses,
there a number of alternative policies for governments to follow. One is the employment
protection route in which governments make it as diﬃcult as possible for ﬁrms to lay oﬀ
workers. This has potentially harmful impact on hiring and does not address the losses
to workers when ﬁrms do in fact go bankrupt. A second option is to provide generous
unemployment beneﬁts for a long time in order to allow workers to search for the best
ﬁt in a new job. Once again this has deleterious side eﬀects and still does not address
the issue that even with such a Unemployment Insurance scheme some workers will still
experience a large negative permanent shock. A third (hypothetical) policy option is to
provide full insurance against such losses. In this paper we attempt to quantify the gains
from such insurance.
Displacement studies have typically been concerned with the eﬀect of displacement on
short run earnings and wages and the duration of joblessness. The attempt to quantify
the long run welfare loss due displacement against a full insurance benchmark faces at
least two major problems. The ﬁrst of these is the diﬃculty in measuring changes in
lifetime welfare. The second problem is that given a sample of displaced workers we do
not have a natural control group who faced full insurance and hence experienced no gain
or loss consequent on their being displaced or not.
As regards the ﬁrst problem, even if we have long panels and examine earnings, the
3mapping from wage or earnings paths to lifetime welfare is not a simple one. In all but
the simplest frictionless labour market models wages depend on household preferences
(discount factors, risk aversion and prudence) and the possibilities open to households
for intertemporal smoothing. Thus changes in wage or earnings possibilities cannot be
simply mapped into changes in welfare without an explicit theory model. In addition,
if there are other potential or actual earners in the household then even a large loss of
earnings by one partner may not lead to a sharp fall in lifetime welfare. Thus the presence
of other potential earners in the household provides some natural (self) insurance even
without outside options. These diﬃc u l t i e sa r ec o m p o u n d e db yt h ef a c tt h a tw ed on o t
usually have a long panel so that we have to extrapolate from short run changes using
standard earnings processes. The latter may not be reliable for those who have recently
been displaced.
In the paper we propose dealing with this problem by using changes in consumption
to trace out long run impacts. Just as with wages or earnings, this require a formal
model within which we can measure and interpret the lifetime loss from observations on
consumption before and after job displacement. We develop such a framework in Section
2 using a conventional life-cycle model with forward looking agents. Our framework takes
account of the fact the short run adjustment to the displacement, the possible presence
of other earners, other idiosyncratic shocks, macro shocks and changes in demographics.
Within this framework the counter factual of interest can be isolated and we can discuss
the choice of estimator. As we shall see, a convenient estimator within our theoretical
framework uses matching techniques.
4The second major problem mentioned above is not having a natural control group.
In the displacement literature the usual comparison is between displaced workers and
workers who retain their job. This comparison is not useful for our purposes since workers
who continue in their jobs and who had a positive prior probability of losing the job
actually experience a welfare gain. Indeed we do not know of any formal framework that
allows us to interpret the outcome of this comparison. In this view, the comparison of the
displaced to those who retain their job overestimates the loss (relative to full insurance)
to the displaced. Instead we compare changes in lifetime outcomes between the displaced
and those who were temporarily laid oﬀ with a certain date of recall. We maintain
that this group is closer to the desired counter-factual since they are in ﬁrms that use
temporary layoﬀs and hence provide insurance (albeit, less than full) to their workers.
This paper is a contribution to three literatures. The ﬁrst is the extensive literature on
the eﬀects of job displacement; see and Fallick (1996), Kletzer (1998) and Kuhn (2002)
for surveys. Second, this paper is related to tests of full insurance and consumption
growth around idiosyncratic shocks such as job loss, illness or disability; see, for example,
Cochrane (1991) and Stephens (2001). Finally, what we present here is a complement
to work on the short run costs of job loss and the impact of Unemployment Insurance
beneﬁts (see Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) and (2003)).
Our main ﬁnding is that permanently displaced workers suﬀer an average consumption
loss of between 4 and 10 percent. Older workers and workers with high job tenure have
losses closer to the top of this range. As this estimate is relative to our best approximation
of a full insurance benchmark, it provides an upper bound on the value of new policy
5initiatives designed to mitigate the costs of job loss.
The next section develops our theoretical framework, which in turn suggests a natural
estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Our results are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes and discusses the policy implications of our results.
2 Theoretical Framework
In a conventional life-cycle model (which assumes a forward-looking, optimizing house-
hold), the marginal utility of expenditure mue λt evolves according to:
λt+1 = λt + εt+1,E t (εt+1)=0 (1)
We now develop a framework that will allow us to quantify the eﬀect of a job loss in
terms of the mue.L e td be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the agent keeps her
job from period t to t +1and 0 if she is displaced. Et() denotes the expectation for a
given agent given the information available to the agent at time t.We assume an additive
structure for the job retention/loss shock and other shocks:




t + ηt+1 (2)
6where Γd
t is the shock consequent on the realization d and ηt+1 is the eﬀect of other
shocks.1 We shall always assume:
Γ
0
t > 0 > Γ
1
t (3)
so that a job loss is equivalent to a wealth loss (which raises the mue, all other things
being equal). Critically for the development below, this allows that retaining a job is a
positive shock for agents who faced a positive probability of job loss. If the agent had






since the realization of d does not make any diﬀerence to the agent. In the displaced
worker literature attention has focussed on diﬀerences between remaining in the job and
being displaced; in the current context this is given by (Γ1
t − Γ0
t). For our policy driven
analysis the appropriate object of interest is Γ0
t, since the full insurance benchmark is
zero.
















ηt+1 | d =0
¢¢
(5)
1The additivity here is arbitrary. Nevertheless, without some structure here it is much hard to make
sense of the question “what are the costs of job loss?” Note that we do not assume that job loss and
other shocks are independently distributed.
7Thus we do not impose that the ‘other’ shocks are independent of the job loss realization.
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and πt is close to unity then Γ0
t >> |Γ1
t| so that
the job loss shock is much greater than the job retention shock.








where zt is a vector of observable factors that aﬀect the size of the job loss shock. These
may include experience, tenure in the current job, union status, or age. Of course, many
determinants of the job loss shock may be unobservable, such as the job match quality
or family ﬁnancial circumstances; these are captured by γ0.
The analysis above focuses on the unobservable mue. The next step is to relate this to
(observable) consumption. Denote consumption in period t by ct.W et a k et h ef o l l o w i n g
form for consumption growth:
∆lnct+1 = ∆φt+1 − ∆λt+1 (8)
where the time varying factor ∆φt+1 includes anticipated changes in factors that aﬀect
utility (for example, age, marital status or children). This includes potentially observable
8factors and unobserved factors.2 Substituting in (1) and (2) and taking expectations
conditional on displacement, d =0 ,w eh a v e :




ηt+1 | d =0
¢
(9)
To simplify notation, we henceforth denote Et
¡





ηt+1 | d =1
¢
by µ1
t) so that we can express a households expected consumption growth conditional on
job loss as:





The objects we aim to estimate are the average eﬀect of job loss on those who expe-
rience it, denoted EH[Γ0
t | d =0 ] ,and the relationship between that mean and observable
characteristics, zt.N o t e t h a t EH[] denotes an average across the population. Thus
EH[Γ0
t | d =0 ]is the analogue, in this context, of the “average eﬀect of the treatment on
the treated”, where the “treatment” is job loss. Given the parameterization in equation
(7), the relationship between this quantity and parameters is captured by γ. Equation
(10) says that the expected consumption growth for job loser is the sum of anticipated
changes, the eﬀe c to ft h ej o bl o s sa n dt h ee ﬀect of other shocks, given that the agent is
2While we think of this formulation as an approximation, it is worth noting that it holds exactly if
(i) the agent has a rate of time preference equal to the interest rate; and (ii) the agent has following per
period utility function:
u(ct)=( φt − 1 − lnct)ct;
φt − 1 − lnct > 0
This utility function has the usual properties: positive marginal utility, risk aversion (a negative second
derivative) and prudence (a positive 3rd derviative.)
9displaced. Averaging across job losers gives:
E
H [Et (∆lnct+1 | d =0 )| d =0 ] (11)
= E
H[∆φt+1,h | d =0 ]− E
H[Γ
0
t,h(zt,h) | d =0 ]− E
H[µ
0
t,h | d =0 ] (12)
= E
H[∆φt+1,h | d =0 ]− E
H[γ
0
t,h | d =0 ]− E
H[γ
0zt,h | d =0 ]− E
H[µ
0
t,h | d =0 ] (13)
If we could assume that µ0
t,h and ∆φt+1,h are uncorrelated with observed job loss cost
factors ( zt) then we could simply regress consumption growth on the observables, for the
sample of displaced workers, to estimate γ. This is unsatisfactory in two respects. First,
EH[γ0 | d =0 ]is not identiﬁed separately from EH[∆φt+1,h | d =0 ]and EH[µ0
t,h | d =0 ] .
This means that, even with this assumption, we can only estimate diﬀerences in the cost
of job loss across individuals but not the overall level. The overall level is crucial from a
policy point of view, where we may (for example) wish to relate the average costs of job
loss to public expenditures on a proposed labour market program.
Second, the assumption that µ0
t,h and ∆φt+1 are uncorrelated with observed job loss






not vary with the observed determinants of the job loss shock such as
age, occupation or education. As regards to ∆φt+1,h, this includes life-cycle factors that
are also likely correlated with γ0 and z: for example, age, material status, and family
type.
Thus identiﬁcation of EH[Γ0
t | d =0 ]and γ requires that we have a way to estimate
EH[∆φt+1,h | d =0 ]and EH[µ0
t,h | d =0 ] . Our strategy for doing so is to use standard
10matching methods to construct a control group. This exploits the additivity assumed





















where X is a set of observable characteristics used to match treatments and controls. In
addition, we will require that standard common support conditions are satisﬁed.
A key point of this paper is to suggest that controls drawn from workers experiencing
continuing employment are unlikely to be appropriate, for two reasons. First, those in
continuing employment may be suﬃciently diﬀerent from job losers that it may not be
possible to adjust for the diﬀerences between them on the basis of observables. Second,
and more subtly, expected consumption growth for someone who is not displaced is the
sum of anticipated changes, the eﬀect of other shocks and the (positive) eﬀect of job
retention:






t,h | d =1
¢
(16)
Thus even if the necessary conditional mean independence holds, we cannot use those in
continuing employment to estimate EH[∆φt+1,h | d =0 ]and EH[µ0
t,h | d =0 ]because
their consumption growth is confounded by Γ1
t.3
3How large might this bias be? Manski and Straub (2000) report that in the mid - 1990s, a sample of
American workers had an subjective expecation of job loss of 15%. If µ0
t = µ1









11T h es o l u t i o nw ep r o p o s ei st od r a wo u rc o n t r o l sf r o mw o r k e r sw h oe x p e r i e n c et e m p o -
rary layoﬀsw i t had e ﬁnite recall date. First, these workers may be more similar to job
losers, and hence make an estimation strategy based on correcting for observable diﬀer-
ences more palatable. More importantly, these workers are receiving insurance against





t ≈ 0 (17)
for these workers. While temporary layoﬀs involve an income loss, it is transitory, with
no loss of job match or ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital. Workers on temporary layoﬀ are
eligible for unemployment insurance, and in some cases temporary layoﬀ procedures are
carefully integrated with unemployment insurance provisions (for example, some workers
temporarily laid oﬀ from unionized ﬁrms receive a ﬁrm or union funded top up to their un-
employment insurance beneﬁts.)4 Thus the consumption growth of workers experiencing
temporary layoﬀs can be used to estimate EH[∆φt+1 | d =0 ]and EH[µ0
t,h | d =0 ] .
To summarize, the empirical strategy that is motivated by the theoretical consider-
ations above, and which we will implement in this paper is as follows. To estimate the
cost of job loss:
Note, however, that our sample of permanent job losers were very like had higher than average proba-
bilities of job loss. If we selected continuously employed controls to match these job losers on the basis
of observable characteristics, it is very likely that we also select controls who had a higher than average
ex ante expectation of job loss. This means a larger π, and hence a large bias.
4Of course, the temporary layoﬀ may reveal information about the future viability of the ﬁrm - and
hence its ability to continue to provide insurance against job loss in the future. Alternatively, for a ﬁrm
whose continued operation is in doubt, a temporary layoﬀ may be a postive shock. Our claim is only
that such considerations are second order, so that temporary layoﬀsp r o v i d eag o o dﬁrst approximation
to a full insurance benchmark.
121. Use consumption growth to measure innovations in the mue.
2. Among the “treatment” group of job losers, consumption growth confounds the
eﬀects of job loss with the eﬀects of other shocks and anticipated changes in the
mue. These confounders would aﬀect consumption growth under the counterfactual
of full insurance against job loss shocks.
3. Construct a matched control group drawn from workers experiencing temporary
layoﬀ. Use this group to estimate consumption growth under the counterfactual of
full insurance against job loss shocks.
4. The diﬀerence in consumption growth between the job losers and matched controls
is an estimate of the cost of job loss among the job losers.
We now turn to a description of the data on which we implement this strategy.
3D a t a
3.1 Survey
The data for this paper are drawn from a panel survey on Canadians who separated
from a job: the Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP). The survey was conducted
by Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) to evaluate the eﬀects of a series
of changes in the Canadian Unemployment system in the mid- 1990s. Approximately
11,000 people who had a job separation in February or May of 1993 were interviewed
three times, at about 26, 39 and 60 weeks after the job separation. In Canada, when a
13job separation occurs, the employer is obliged to ﬁl ea“ R e c o r do fE m p l o y m e n t ”( R O E )
with HRDC. These reports are compiled into the database from which the sampling frame
was constructed. We refer to the job separation that led to inclusion in the sample as
the “reference” separation.5 Interviews were conducted over the telephone and took an
average of 25 minutes.
A second sample of some 8,000 individuals who separated from a job in February or
May of 1995 was subsequently drawn. The survey instrument was reﬁned (and slightly
expanded) for this second survey but care was taken to insure backwards comparability.
In addition, the third interview was dropped. Together, the 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys
provide a large sample of individuals who separated from a job. The period of 1993 to
1995 was one of slowly improving labour market conditions in Canada (for example, the
aggregate unemployment rate fell from 11.2 to 9.5%).
A feature of the data is the wide range of questions were asked including questions
on the pre-separation job and reason for separation; labour market activity; job search
details; the activities of other household members; income; expenditure and assets. The
availability of expenditure data in a survey of this type is somewhat unique; further
details on these questions are given below.
In this paper our primary focus is on information about expenditures in the period
prior to the job separation (collected retrospectively at the ﬁr s ti n t e r v i e w )a n da tt h el a s t
5Because the administrative records that form the sampling frame are not complete until some months
after the job separation, it was not possible to have the ﬁrst interview closer to the separation date. Thus
survey information about the periods just before and after the job separation are asked retrospectively
from a point some 6 months on. This long interval between the job separation and the ﬁrst interview is
the price of a sample of only those who experience a job separation; this price is somewhat mitigated by
the availability of complimentary administrative data which is collected continuously.
14o p p o r t u n i t yw eh a v et oo b s e r v et h er e s p o n d e n t s( t h et h i r di n t e r v i e wf o rr e s p o n d e n t si n
the 1993 sample and the second interview for respondents in the 1995 sample). The timing
of the interviews was adjusted between the 1993 and 1995 samples so that the timing
(relative to the job separation) of the third interview for the former sample corresponds
roughly to the timing of the second interview for the latter sample. The details of
interview timing are presented in Table A1, in the Appendix.
One reason to focus on the last point at which respondents are observed is that
we wish to examine the change in the marginal utility of wealth (“permanent income”)
across a job loss. At earlier interviews, as smaller fraction of respondents are back in some
employment and a greater fraction of the sample may be liquidity constrained. Where
respondents are liquidity constrained our analysis of the permanent shock is confounded.6
3.2 Sample
With regard to sample selection we begin considering only respondents between the ages
of 20 and 60, and exclude single adults living with parents or unrelated adults. Extensive
experience with the data (as well as common sense) suggests that the latter group return
expenditure information which is of poor quality. We also exclude workers who held
multiple jobs at the separation date, one of which was ongoing.
Next we limit the sample to workers whose “reference” job had a duration of 6 months
6The 1995 data contain direct questions about credit constraints between the job loss and the ﬁrst
interview, and at the ﬁrst interview data. These have been analyzed by Crossley and Low, (2004). The
reported incidence of binding credit constraints in these data is quite low. About a one in four permanent
layoﬀs report being unable to borrow at the ﬁrst interview, but only about one in twenty-ﬁve report that
this is a binding constraint.
15or more. This corresponds to the notion that a job loss presumes some attachment to the
job. In fact, many studies have deﬁned displaced workers as having “established work
histories” (Kletzer, 1998) and some studies have limited their analysis to workers who
lost jobs in which they had rather considerable tenure (for example, Jacobson, Lalonde
and Sullivan (1993)). In our empirical analysis diﬀerences across workers with diﬀerent
levels of pre-separation tenure will be an important focus.
We use self reported (survey) information to identify layoﬀsa n dq u i t s . 7 We then limit
the quit group to those who self reported that they quit to take another job. We have
402 such individuals. While layoﬀs are our primary focus, these voluntary job switchers
provide some useful contrasts. In particular, among workers who voluntarily moved to
(presumably better) jobs, one would expect that the shock of the job separation is, if
anything, positive (the mue falls).
Among the layoﬀs, we distinguish types of layoﬀs on the basis of a series of survey
questions about the ex ante (at time of layoﬀ) expectation of recall. We deﬁne workers
to have had a strong expectation of recall if they expected to be recalled on a speciﬁc
date. We also refer to this group as “temporary layoﬀs”. Those workers who reported
no expectation of recall are our “permanent layoﬀs” and this is the principal group of
interest for this study. Note that this ex ante deﬁnition of job loss or “displacement”
diﬀers from much of the displaced worker literature in which “displacement” is deﬁned
in terms of ex poste realizations. However, conditioning on “time 0" information is much
more natural in the consumption growth framework developed in the previous section.
7The data also contain an administrative reason for separation (from the ROE form). These correlate
reasonably well with self reported reasons, but have the drawback of a very large “other” category.
16We also have a group of workers who expected recall but reported that they did not have
a particular date by which they expected to be recalled. We refer to these workers as
having “some expectation of recall”.
Our data contain 3028 “permanent layoﬀs” (no expectation of recall), 1094 “tempo-
rary layoﬀs” (strong expectation of recall) and 1419 workers with some expectation of
recall. The large number of temporary layoﬀs may be surprising to readers from outside
North America, but the important role of temporary layoﬀsi nu n e m p l o y m e n ti nN o r t h
American labour markets is well documented (see for example, Feldstein, 1976).8
Tables A2 through A4 in the Appendix document the demographic and economic
characteristics of respondents in each of the four groups just deﬁned. The ﬁrst panel
o fT a b l eA 2r e p o r t sd e m o g r a p h i cc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h em o s td r a m a t i cd i ﬀerences - in
terms of age, education, and local labour market conditions - are between quits and
layoﬀs. The second panel of this Table reports economic characteristics prior to the
reference separation. Relative to all layoﬀs, the quits have much shorter tenures on
average. Comparing the temporary and permanent layoﬀsw en o t et h a tt h et e m p o r a r y
layoﬀs are more likely to be unionized and have higher tenures. Note also that more than
8 0 %o ft h e me x p e c t e dt h el a y o ﬀ. This further supports the notion that for this group, the
shock associated with actual separation may be small, and thus that they may provide a
good approximation to the full insurance benchmark.
In Table A3 we document the employment outcomes for these groups as of the ﬁrst
interview. There is attrition in our sample between the ﬁrst and last interviews (see the
8It’s worth noting that the Canadian Unemployment Insurance system (unlike the U.S. system) has
no experience rating of ﬁrms.
17ﬁrst few rows of Table A2). In Table A3 we report the same ﬁrst interview information for
all ﬁrst interview respondents (in the top panel) and for the sub sample that subsequently
responded to the second interview (in the bottom panel). Comparing the top and bottom
panels we note that the numbers are very similar. Thus this very simple exercise does
not reveal any evidence that the attrition was nonrandom.
In terms of the actual outcomes we note that re-employment is much higher among
temporary layoﬀs and quits than permanent layoﬀs. A small number of ex ante permanent
layoﬀsd or e t u r nt ot h e i rf o r m e rﬁrm, while some ex ante temporary layoﬀst a k ew o r k
else where. If not re-employed, a permanent layoﬀ is more likely to be actively searching
than a temporary layoﬀ. Workers with “some expectation of recall” exhibit outcomes
which lie somewhere between the permanent and temporary layoﬀ groups.
In Table 4 we summarize the labour market outcomes for these groups at the ﬁnal
interview. Interestingly, the employment rate among temporary layoﬀsf a l lf r o mt h eﬁrst
to ﬁnal interview. This may be because the ﬁnal interview is in the ﬁfth quarter after
the reference separation, and temporary layoﬀs are often seasonal in nature (even in non-
seasonal manufacturing industries). By this point some 15% (26% of the 57% employed)
of ex ante permanent layoﬀs have returned to their former ﬁrm, while have almost 20%
(29% of the 66% employed) ex ante temporary layoﬀs are working at a new ﬁrm.
3.3 Expenditure Questions
For the purposes of this paper the most important set of variables are those concerning
expenditures. Two sets of questions were asked at each interview. The ﬁrst was a set of
18levels questions concerning expenditures in the past week or month on a range of goods
including housing; food at home; food outside the home; clothing and total expenditures
in a month. The second set comprised a single question regarding the change in total
expenditures relative to the month prior to the ROE (separation) date. In this paper
our focus in on total expenditures. This is consistent with the theoretical framework
developed in the previous section. It is also the only (expenditure) quantity for which
we have pre-separation information. Since these questions are somewhat unusual in a
survey of this type, we present the full text of the questions here. At each interview, the
respondent was asked:
About how much did you and your household spend on everything in the past
month? Please think about all bills such as rent, mortgage loan payments,
utility and other bills, as well as all expenses such as food, clothing, trans-
portation, entertainment and any other expenses you and your household may
have.
And:
Has the amount you spend on everything decreased since <ROE>?
By what amount monthly?
Has the amount you spend on everything increased since <ROE>?
By what amount monthly?
The ﬁrst question provides ct+1 (consumption at the interview date) and the following




Although the answers to these questions are undoubtedly noisy, we have several rea-
sons to believe that they contain signiﬁcant information about the levels and changes in
household expenditures. First, we note that in each survey the expenditure questions
are asked before income questions, so that we think it is less likely that the respondents
just report incomes in response to expenditure questions. Second in other work (Brown-
ing and Crossley, 2001, 2003; Browning, Crossley and Weber, 2004) and in unreported
subsidiary analysis, we have amassed considerable internal evidence of the validity of the
expenditure responses in the COEP. In particular income elasticities and demographic
eﬀects can be precisely estimated with this data (which would not be the case if the data
were simply noise) and the data perform well in a series of budget share and Engel curve
comparisons with the FAMEX, a Canadian household budget survey thought to be of
excellent quality.
3.4 A First Look at Earnings and Consumption Growth
Before turning to formal estimates of the costs of job loss, we provide a descriptive
analysis of earnings and consumption growth from just before a job separation until the
ﬁfth quarter after job loss. Figure 1 presents box and whisker plots of proportional
consumption and earnings changes for layoﬀs with strong expectation of recall (ie., a
9It is possible, of course, to construct ct (consumption just prior to the reference separation) from
ct+1 and ∆ct+1,a n dt h e na p p o x i m a t e∆lnct+1by
∆ct+1
ct .However, for the relative small growth rates we
consider, the two approximations diﬀer little, and
∆ct+1
ct would, in the present context, it is likely that
∆ct+1
ct suﬀer from greater measurement error in the denominator.
20recall date), some expectation of recall, and no expectation of recall (permanent layoﬀs)
as well as quits. In each case the left hand box reﬂects earnings growth and the right
hand box consumption growth. A number of statistics corresponding to these pictures
are presented in Table 1a. Diﬀerences across groups in earnings growth are stark. Five
quarters out, the median individual who quit to take another job experienced substantial
earnings growth (9%) while the median permanent layoﬀ has earnings almost 50% below
their pre-separation level. Both parametric tests of common means and nonparametric
rank tests suggest that the distribution of proportional earnings changes of permanent
layoﬀs is strongly statistically diﬀerent from that of the other groups.
In contrast to earnings, the diﬀerences in consumption growth are not so visually
striking. In every category the median change in consumption is zero. Nevertheless,
those who quit to take another job do appear - in both the ﬁgure and in the mean - to
experience stronger consumption growth than the other groups. The diﬀerences among
the other groups are diﬃcult to discern from the box and whisker plots, but the statistical
tests reported in the bottom panel of Table 1a conﬁrm that the permanent layoﬀsa r e
diﬀerent from each of the other groups. Temporary layoﬀs (strong expectation of recall)
experience stronger consumption growth than those with some expectation of recall, who
in turn experience more consumpti o ng r o w t ht h a np e r m a n e n tl a y o ﬀs (no expectation
of recall). As noted in the introduction, there are a number of reasons to expect that
any proportional change in individual earnings translates into a rather smaller change
in household consumption (the earnings loss may be transitory, the individual may be
providing only a fraction of household income). Nevertheless, the striking diﬀerences in
21earnings and consumption data, combined with the way the consumption data are col-
lected, may suggest to some readers that the consumption data is simply noise. However,
the statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences across groups, and the strong consumption growth
of those who quit to take another job refutes that position.
As ﬁrst reported in Table A1, the weeks elapsed between separation from the reference
job and the ﬁnal interview varies between approximately 54 and 64 weeks in our sample.
The bottom row of Table 1a reports that the mean is between 58 and 59 weeks (about
9/8 of a year) for each of our separation type groups. Thus variation in elapsed time
does not seem to have played any role in the heterogeneity in earnings and consumption
growth across groups. Notice also that the data underlying both the ﬁgures and tables
is nominal. This was a relatively low inﬂation period in Canada. The respondents to
our sample experienced proportional changes in the CPI which ranged from -0.0018 to
0.027 (inﬂation of -0.1 to 2.7%). The bottom row of Table 5 reports that there was some
diﬀerence in the inﬂation experienced across groups, with in particular the permanent
layoﬀs experiencing on average one percentage point less inﬂation. This is a very small
component of the diﬀerences in nominal consumption and earnings changes.
Figure 2 repeats the analysis of Figure 1, but with the sample limited to those who
report being back in employment at the last interview. The corresponding statistics are
reported in Table 1b. Several features of the Table bear notice. First, the diﬀerences in
earnings growth across layoﬀ groups largely disappear (in the means and ﬁg u r e s-t h er a n k
tests still suggest statistically diﬀerent distributions). Furthermore the median earnings
change in each layoﬀ group is non-negative. This suggests that among our sample the
22earnings changes associated with job separations are all associated with non-employment
(and not with wage changes). This is inconsistent with studies of job displacement which
have focussed on highly attached workers (for example Ruhm, 1991) which ﬁnd that
both wage and employment changes play a role, but it is consistent with studies such
as (Polsky, 1999) which examine job losers of a broad range of labour force attachment.
However, further breakdowns by tenure in the reference job revealed that in our data, as
in most other studies, high tenure workers experience wage losses on re-employment.10
A key result of this analysis is the very strong consumption growth exhibited by
voluntary job switchers, which averages 10% (over a period just longer than a year). A
reasonable interpretation of the data is that these workers have experienced a signiﬁcant
positive shock to their lifetime wealth. This observation supports our assertion that great
care must be taken in comparing displaced workers to workers who are not displaced.
In now turn to implementing the estimation strategy developed in Section 2. In doing
so, we set aside the data on quits and on respondents with some expectation of recall,
and focus on the permanent layoﬀs (our “treatment” group) and the temporary layoﬀs
(those with a strong expectation of recall, from which we draw our controls.)
4 Estimation Results
The ﬁrst row of Table 2a reports the average consumption growth for our full sample
of permanent layoﬀs, and our full sample of temporary layoﬀs. The former report an
10Full results are available from the authors.
23average consumption loss of 3.1%, while the latter report average consumption growth of
2.5%. The diﬀerence between these averages is -5.6%.11
However, the permanent and temporary layoﬀsd i ﬀer in many observable ways. There-
fore we use a matching procedure to estimate the counterfactual consumption growth of
the permanent layoﬀs. As noted above, our data are quite rich, so it is possible to match
treatments and controls on a wide range of pre-treatment (that is, pre-displacement)
characteristics. To reduce the dimension of the matching problem, we match on the es-
timated propensity score. This was ﬁrst suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and
is now quite common in the evaluation literature (see, for example, Smith and Todd,
2003). In our context, the propensity score is the conditional probability that a worker in
our sample is permanently (not temporarily) laid oﬀ. Propensity score matching estima-
tors were implemented using PSMATCH2 in STATA. PSMATCH2 is generously made
available by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
The propensity score was estimated using a Probit model. The explanatory variables
in this model included conditioned on a quadratic in age, gender, education dummies
and the logarithm of household size; dummies for marital status and spousal employment
status; dummies indicating capital income and home ownership; occupation dummies, a
union dummy and job tenure dummies; a dummy for unemployment insurance use in the
previous two years; a polynomial in earnings in the reference job; the local unemployment
rate; region and time dummies. The distributions of estimated propensity scores in the
11Sample sizes reported here diﬀer from those in our informal data analysis because of item non-
response - either to the one or more of the consumption questions or to one or more of the co-variates we
use to match treatments and controls. Because our data are rich and we control for a very large number
of observable characteristics in our matching estimators, some loss of sample is inevitable.
24treatment and control groups are presented in Figure 3.
With the estimated propensity score in hand, common support was imposed. This
involved discarding 18 permanent layoﬀs with propensity scores greater than the largest
propensity score among the temporary layoﬀs. Matching was then done by locally linear
regression. The result of this exercise is reported in the second row of Table 2a. The
average consumption group for permanent layoﬀs satisfying the common support con-
dition is -3.0%. The average counterfactual consumption growth for this group (based
on the matched controls) is 3.4%. Therefore, we estimate that this group experienced a
consumption loss of 6.4%, relative to a benchmark of full insurance against job loss. This
is the Average Eﬀect of the Treatment on the Treated. A 95% conﬁdence interval for this
estimate was constructed using the percentile method on 999 bootstrap replications. This
conﬁdence interval, which accounts for the fact that the propensity score is estimated,
is -9.9% to -3.6%. Thus the average consumption loss is certainly statistically diﬀerent
from zero.
We also investigated the robustness of this estimate to diﬀerent aspects of the match-
ing procedure. In particular, we (i) halved and doubled the bandwidth for the locally
linear regression; (ii) trimmed the 5% of treatments whose propensities scores corre-
sponded to the lowest estimated densities among controls; (iii) matched on the index
rather than predicted probability; and (iv) used a single nearest neighbor match rather
than locally linear regression. The resulting point estimates ranged from -5.5% to -6.7%,
indicating that our baseline estimate is robust to these choices.
As suggested in Section 2, it is of interest to know not just the average loss with
25displacement, but how that loss varies with observable characteristics. Accordingly, we
repeated the above exercise for diﬀerent subsamples of the permanent layoﬀs. The results
are reported in Table 2b. Rows 1, 2 and 3 deal respectively with permanent layoﬀs
losing a union job, permanent layoﬀs over 40 years of age, and permanent layoﬀsl o s i n g
a job in which they had 10 or more years of tenure. (These groups are obviously not
mutually exclusive). The results indicate that olders workers, and workers with high job
tenure experience particularly large consumption losses if permanently laid oﬀ.T h ep o i n t
estimates are -9.3% and -10.4% respectively.
Finally, in Table 2c, we attempt to deal empirically with two possible shortcomings
of the theoretical framework developed in Section 2. The ﬁr s ti s s u ew ec o n s i d e ri st h a t
our theoretical framework associates the cost of job loss with the revision to the mue
between the separation date (t) and a date just over a year later (t+1). If displacement
was known with certainty prior to our pre-separation consumption observation, then the
theory suggests that information should be fully incorporated into λt and hence ct. Our
empirical strategy would then fail to capture the cost of job loss.12
We cannot examine consumption changes prior to the separation date with our short
panel. However, respondents to the COEP surveys were asked (retrospective) questions
about formal notice of lay oﬀ and whether they “expected” the lay oﬀ. Respondents were
asked whether they received notice, and if so, how much notice they received. They were
also asked whether they expected the lay oﬀ, and for how long they held this expectation.
12Existing evidence on this point is somewhat mixed. For example, Stephens (2001), using the P.S.I.D.
reports that household food consumption falls prior to a job loss, presumably as the probability of job
loss rises. However, Stephens (2004) reports that food consumption drops with job loss in the Health
and Retirement Survey do not appear to vary with households subjective job loss expectations.
26There is obviously some ambiguity regarding the interpretation of the latter. The pre-
separation consumption question refers to the “month before job ended.” To identify
workers who clearly had information about the layoﬀ prior to this period, we constructed
dummy variables for receiving advance notice 6 or more weeks prior to the layoﬀ,a n d
for expecting the layoﬀ 6 or more weeks prior to the layoﬀ.13 Unfortunately, in the 1993
survey the questions regarding length of notice and length of expectation were asked of a
random 20 percent of respondents. Thus using these questions results in a substantial loss
of sample size (albeit one where the data are missing at random.) Reports of signiﬁcant
notice (or expectation) turn out to be uncommon in these data. Among the permanent
layoﬀs for which we have complete information, 12 percent had formal notice of the layoﬀ
6 or more weeks prior to the layoﬀ date, while 24 percent reported expecting the layoﬀ
6o rm o r ew e e k sp r i o rt ot h el a y o ﬀ date. In the ﬁr s tt w or o w so fT a b l e2 cw er e p o r t
repeating the matching estimate of the eﬀect of job loss on consumption growth while
deleting these respondents. Deleting those reporting formal notice of the layoﬀ 6o rm o r e
weeks prior to the layoﬀ date essentially leaves our point estimate unchanged, at -6.6%.
Deleting those reporting expectation of the layoﬀ 6 or more weeks prior to the layoﬀ date
leads a point estimate of -10.4%. This is somewhat larger than our baseline estimate
and can be interpreted as the average eﬀect of an unexpected displacement on those who
experienced an unexpected displacement.
13T h ec h o i c eo f6w e e k sh e r er e ﬂects in part an ambiguity in the wording of the consumption question.
It is not clear wether respondents would interpret “the month before the job ended” as the 30 days
terminating with the layoﬀ date or the last full calendar month prior to the layoﬀ date. In either
case, repondents with notice (or expectation) 6 or more weeks before the layoﬀ date certainly had this
information prior to period for which they report pre-separation consumption.
27The second issue we consider is that our development in Section 2 (especially Equation
(8)) assumes separability of consumption and labor supply. Without this separability,
changes in consumption might reﬂect substitutions with leisure rather than changes in
the mue. As a rough check on this possibility, we implemented our estimator on the
subsample of layoﬀs that were in employment at the last interview (so that labor supply
was broadly similar at the pre- and post-displacement observations.) The results of this
exercise are reported in the last row of Table 2c. This sample restriction leads to a point
estimate of -4.6%. This is slightly smaller (in absolute value) than our baseline estimate,
but does not signiﬁcantly change our assessment.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Workers displaced by a plant closure or other permanent layoﬀ may experience a substan-
tial loss of lifetime wealth and welfare. Such workers disproportionately bear the costs
of the adjustments necessary for the continued economic prosperity of their society. It
is appropriate therefore, that the losses experienced by displaced workers have been of
considerable interest to both economists and policy makers. This paper contributes to
the literature that attempts to measure those losses. It departs from that literature in
three main ways.
First, we maintain that changes in consumption are a useful measure of the costs of job
loss. The prior literature focusses on wages, the duration of unemployment, and earnings.
To the extent that households are rational and forward looking, consumption changes
28provide reﬂect both the household’s ability to adjust to the shock, through a variety
of means, and the household’s expectations of the long run eﬀects of the job loss. Thus
consumption changes provide a measure of the cost of job loss that is both comprehensive
and long run. It is worth noting that in this context the theoretical framework suggests
a measure (consumption) that diminishes the need for a long time series of observation
on each household; a short panel will do.
Second, we emphasize the need to deﬁne a counterfactual. The counterfactual we
propose is a situation in which society provides full insurance against job loss shocks.
Job loss costs relative to this benchmark provide an upper bound on the beneﬁto fany
new cost mitigating policy introduced in current economic environment.
Third, we argue that estimating the cost of job loss requires a control group, and
that the choice of control group is strongly inﬂuenced by the choice ofc o u n t e r f a c t u a l
or benchmark. The past literature on displaced worker has either forgone a control
group, or (implicitly or explicitly) drawn controls from the pool of non-displaced workers
in the data at hand. We argue that, given our choice of counterfactual, workers in
continuing employment may be poor controls. A conventional life-cycle model suggests
that such workers experience the positive shock of job retention. In our analysis, we
employ alternative, novel source of controls: workers experiencing temporary layoﬀsw i t h
a known date of recall. Firms that use temporary layoﬀs to manage demand shocks
eﬀectively insure their workers against job loss. Thus these workers provide a way to
approximate average consumption growth under the counter factual.
Our main ﬁnding is that permanently displaced workers suﬀer a consumption loss of
294 to 10% of pre-job-loss consumption, with a point estimate of 6.4%. One way to assess
this number is to note that our estimate of consumption growth under the counterfactual
of full insurance is 3.4% over a period just longer than a year.
Consumption losses are conceptually diﬀerent from earnings losses. Earnings losses
may be persistent, but both theory and data suggest that they are not fully persistent:
there is eventually some “catch up.” Most workers ﬁnd new employment, and there may
be some recovery of wages as they accumulate new ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital or match
quality. In contrast, the theoretical framework developed in Section 2 suggests that
consumption losses are roughly permanent. The intuition behind this claim is that a
forward looking household’s post-displacement consumption choice already reﬂects their
best guess of future earnings, including any anticipated “catch up.”
One would like know not just the average loss with displacement, but how that loss
varies with observable characteristics. This is a necessary input into targeting adjustment
policies to those most aﬀected by displacement. Our analysis indicates that older workers,
and workers with high pre-displacement job tenure have considerably larger average losses
- perhaps double the average for all displaced workers.
F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a to u re s t i m a t e sr e ﬂect the current economic environment, including
those adjustment and assistance policies already in place. Thus while our estimates
are informative about the size of the losses that could be mitigated by further policy
initiatives, they are not informative about the consequences of removing or scaling back
current provisions.
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TABLE 1A:  Descriptive Statistics: Earnings and Expenditure Changes 
Pre- reference separation to last interview   
Proportional Changes in nominal monthly Amounts 
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TABLE 1b:  Descriptive Statistics: Earnings and Expenditure Changes 
Pre- reference separation to last interview   
Proportional changes in nominal monthly amounts 
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TABLE 2a:  The Effect of Permanent Job Loss on Consumption Growth - Baseline Estimates 







Temporary Layoffs  
















-3.0 3.4  -6.4 
[-9.6, -3.8] 
 
Notes to the Matching Estimate (2
nd Row): 
1.  Treatments and controls were matched on the estimated propensity score, and common 
support was imposed. The propensity score was estimated with a Probit. Matching was 
done by locally linear regression. Additional details are in the text. 
2.  The difference reported in the far right column is an estimate of the Average Effect of 
the Treatment on the Treated (where the treatment is job loss.) 
3.  The confidence interval was constructed using the percentile method on 999 bootstrap 
replications.  
4.  An investigation into the robustness of the estimates to different aspects of the matching 
procedure was conducted. In particular, we (i) halved and doubled the bandwidth for 
the locally linear regression; (ii) trimmed the 5% of treatments whose propensities 
scores corresponded to the lowest estimated densities among controls; (iii) matched on 
the index rather than predicted probability; and (iv) used a single nearest neighbour 
match rather than locally linear regression.  The resulting point estimates ranged from -






TABLE 2b:  The Effect of Permanent Job Loss on Consumption Growth - Subsamples 
                         (Matched Controls, Common Support) 







Temporary Layoffs  






Unionized   386 
305 
-2.6 2.1  -4.7 
[-8.4, -0.8] 
Age > 40 years  579 
264 
-6.4 2.9  -9.3 
[-14.3, -4.5] 
Job Tenure  
> 10 years 
218 
172 




1.  Treatments and controls were matched on the estimated propensity score, and common 
support was imposed. The propensity score was estimated with a Probit. Matching was 
done by locally linear regression. Additional details are in the text. 
2.  The difference reported in the far right column is an estimate of the Average Effect of 
the Treatment on the Treated (where the treatment is job loss.) 








TABLE 2c:  The Effect of Permanent Job Loss on Consumption Growth – Subsamples II 
                         (Matched Controls, Common Support) 







Temporary Layoffs  







< 6 weeks (incl. 0) 
503 
392 
-1.6 5.0  -6.6 
[-13.3, -0.9] 
Expected Job Loss 
< 6 weeks (incl. 0) 
599 
293 
-2.4 8.0  -10.4 
[-14.7, -2.9] 








1.  Treatments and controls were matched on the estimated propensity score, and common 
support was imposed. The propensity score was estimated with a Probit. Matching was 
done by locally linear regression. Additional details are in the text. 
2.  The difference reported in the far right column is an estimate of the Average Effect of 
the Treatment on the Treated (where the treatment is job loss.) 





Appendix A: Further Data Description 
 
 
TABLE A1:  Interview Timing, 1993 and 1995 COEP  
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of RecallFigure 2: Proportional Income and Expenditure Changes
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